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Abstract
Smartphone apps often run with full privileges to ac-
cess the network and sensitive local resources, making
it difficult for remote systems to have any trust in the
provenance of network connections they receive. Even
within the phone, different apps with different privileges
can communicate with one another, allowing one app to
trick another into improperly exercising its privileges (a
Confused Deputy attack). In QUIRE, we engineered two
new security mechanisms into Android to address these
issues. First, we track the call chain of IPCs, allow-
ing an app the choice of operating with the diminished
privileges of its callers or to act explicitly on its own be-
half. Second, a lightweight signature scheme allows any
app to create a signed statement that can be verified any-
where inside the phone. Both of these mechanisms are
reflected in network RPCs, allowing remote systems vis-
ibility into the state of the phone when an RPC is made.
We demonstrate the usefulness of QUIRE with two ex-
ample applications. We built an advertising service, run-
ning distinctly from the app which wants to display ads,
which can validate clicks passed to it from its host. We
also built a payment service, allowing an app to issue
a request which the payment service validates with the
user. An app cannot not forge a payment request by di-
rectly connecting to the remote server, nor can the local
payment service tamper with the request.
1 Introduction
On a smartphone, applications are typically given broad
permissions to make network connections, access local
data repositories, and issue requests to other apps on the
device. For Apple’s iPhone, the only mechanism that
protects users from malicious apps is the vetting pro-
cess for an app to get into Apple’s app store. (Apple
also has the ability to remotely delete apps, although it’s
something of an emergency-only system.) However, any
iPhone app might have its own security vulnerabilities,
perhaps through a buffer overflow attack, which can give
an attacker full access to the entire phone.
The Android platform, in contrast, has no significant
vetting process before an app is posted to the Android
Market. Instead, applications from different authors run
with different Unix user ids, containing the damage if an
application is compromised. (In this aspect, Android fol-
lows a design similar to SubOS [15].) However, this does
nothing to defend a trusted app from being manipulated
by a malicious app via IPC (i.e., a Confused Deputy at-
tack [13]). Likewise, there is no mechanism to prevent
an IPC callee from misrepresenting the intentions of its
caller to a third party.
This mutual distrust arises in many mobile applica-
tions. Consider the example of a mobile advertisement
system. An application hosting an ad would rather the ad
run in a distinct process, with its own user-id, so bugs in
the ad system do not impact the host. Similarly, the ad
system might not trust its host to display the ad correctly,
and must be concerned with hosts that try to generate
fake clicks to inflate their ad revenue.
To address these concerns, we introduce QUIRE, a
low-overhead security mechanism that provides impor-
tant context in the form of provenance and OS managed
data security to local and remote apps communicating by
IPC and RPC respectively. QUIRE uses two techniques
to provide security to communicating applications.
First, QUIRE transparently annotates IPCs occurring
within the phone such that the recipient of an IPC re-
quest can observe the full call chain associated with the
request. When an application wishes to make a network
RPC, it might well connect to a raw network socket, but
it would lack credentials that we can build into the OS,
which can speak to the state of an RPC in a way that
an app cannot forge. (This contextual information can
be thought of as a generalization of the information pro-
vided by the recent HTTP Origin header [2], used by web
servers to help defeat cross-site request forgery (CSRF)
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attacks.)
Second, QUIRE uses simple cryptographic mecha-
nisms to protect data moving over IPC and RPC chan-
nels. QUIRE provides a mechanism for an app to tag an
object with cheap message authentication codes, using
keys that are shared with a trusted OS service. When
data annotated in this manner moves off the device, the
OS can verify the signature and speak to the integrity of
the message in the RPC.
Applications. QUIRE enables a variety of useful appli-
cations. Consider the case of in-application advertising.
A large number of free applications include advertise-
ments from services like AdMob. AdMob is presently
implemented as a library that runs in the same process
as the application hosting the ad, creating trivial oppor-
tunities for the application to spoof information to the
server, such as claiming an ad is displayed when it isn’t,
or claiming an ad was clicked when it wasn’t. In QUIRE,
the advertisement service runs as a separate application
and interacts with the displaying app via IPC calls. The
remote application’s server can now reliably distinguish
RPC calls coming from its trusted agent, and can further
distinguish legitimate clicks from forgeries, because ev-
ery UI event is tagged with a MAC, for which the OS
will vouch.
Consider also the case of payment services. Many
smartphone apps would like a way to sell things, lever-
aging payment services from PayPal, Google Checkout,
and other such services. We would like to enable an ap-
plication to send a payment request to a local payment
agent, who can then pass the request on to its remote
server. The payment agent must be concerned with the
main app trying to issue fraudulent payment requests, so
it needs to validate requests with the user. Similarly, the
main app might be worried about the payment agent mis-
behaving, so it wants to create unforgeable “purchase or-
ders” which the payment app cannot corrupt. All of this
can be easily accomplished with our new mechanisms.
Challenges. For QUIRE to be successful, we must ac-
complish a number of goals. Our design must be suffi-
ciently general to capture a variety of use cases for aug-
mented internal and remote communication. Toward that
end, we build on many concepts from Taos [32], includ-
ing its compound principals and logic of authentication
(see Section 2). Our implementation must be fast. Ev-
ery IPC call in the system must be annotated and must be
subsequently verifiable without having a significant im-
pact on throughput, latency, or battery life. (Section 3 de-
scribes QUIRE’s implementation, and Section 5 presents
our performance measurements.) QUIRE expands on re-
lated work from a variety of fields, including existing
Android research, web security, distributed authentica-
tion logics, and trusted platform measurements (see Sec-
tion 6). We expect QUIRE to serve as a platform for fu-
ture work in secure UI design, as a substrate for future re-
search in web browser engineering, and as starting point
for a variety of applications (see Section 7).
2 Design
Fundamentally, the design goal of QUIRE is to allow
apps to reason about the call-chain and data prove-
nance of requests, occurring on the host platform via
IPC or on a remote server via RPC, before commit-
ting to a security-relevant decision. This design goal is
shared by a variety of other systems, ranging from Java’s
stack inspection [28, 29] to many newer systems that
rely on data tainting or information flow control (see,
e.g., [18, 19, 9]). In QUIRE, much like in stack inspec-
tion, we wish to support legacy code without much, if
any modification. However, unlike stack inspection, we
don’t want to modify the system to annotate and track
every method invocation, nor would we like to suffer
the runtime costs of dynamic data tainting as in Taint-
Droid [9]. Likewise, we wish to operate correctly with
apps that have natively compiled code, not just Java
code (an issue with traditional stack inspection and with
TaintDroid). Instead, we observe that we only need to
track calls across IPC boundaries, which happen far less
frequently than method invocations, and which already
must pay significant overheads for data marshaling, con-
text switching, and copying.
Stack inspection has the property that the available
privileges at the end of a call chain represent the intersec-
tion of the privileges of every app along the chain (more
on this in Section 2.2), which is good for preventing Con-
fused Deputy attacks, but doesn’t solve a variety of other
problems, such as validating the integrity of individual
data items as they are passed from one app to another or
over the network. For that, we need semantics akin to
digital signatures, but we need to be much more efficient
(more on this in Section 2.3).
Versus information flow Our design is necessarily
less precise than dynamic taint analysis, but it’s also in-
credibly flexible. We can avoid the need to annotate code
with static security policies, as would be required in in-
formation flow-typed systems like Jif [20]. We similarly
do not need to poly-instantiate services to ensure that
each instance only handles a single security label as in
systems like DStar/HiStar [33]. Instead, in QUIRE, an
application which handles requests from multiple callers
will pass along an object annotated with the originator’s
context when it makes downstream requests on behalf of
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the original caller.
Likewise, where a dynamic tainting system like Taint-
Droid [9] would generally allow a sensitive operation,
like learning the phone’s precise GPS location, to occur,
but would forbid it from flowing to an unprivileged app;
QUIRE will carry the unprivileged context through to the
point where the dangerous operation is about to happen,
and will then forbid the operation. An information flow
approach is thus more likely to catch corner cases (e.g.,
where an app caches location data, so no privileged call
is ever performed), but is also more likely to have false
positives (where it must conservatively err on the side of
flagging a flow that is actually just fine). A programmer
in an information flow system would need to tag these
false positive corner cases as acceptable, whereas a pro-
grammer in QUIRE would need to add additional security
checks to corner cases that would otherwise be allowed.
2.1 Authentication logic and cryptography
In order to reason about the semantics of QUIRE, we
need a formal model to express what the various oper-
ations in QUIRE will do. Toward that end, we use the
Abadi et al. [1] (hereafter “ABLP”) logic of authentica-
tion, as used in Taos [32]. In this logic, principals make
statements, which can include various forms of quotation
(“Alice says that Bob says X”) and authorization (e.g.,
“Alice says that Bob speaks for Alice”). ABLP nicely
models the behavior of cryptographic operations, where
cryptographic keys speak for other principals, and we can
use this model to reason about cross-process communi-
cation on a device or over the network.
For the remainder of the current section, we will flesh
out QUIRE’s IPC and RPC design in terms of ABLP and
the cryptographic mechanisms we have adopted.
2.2 IPC provenance
The goal of QUIRE’s IPC provenance system is to allow
endpoints that protect sensitive resources, like a user’s
fine grained GPS data or contact information, to reason
about the complete IPC call-chain of a request for the
resource before granting access to it.
QUIRE realizes this goal by modifying the Android
IPC middle-ware layer to automatically build calling
context as an IPC call-chain is formed. Consider a call-
chain where three principals A, B, and C, are commu-
nicating. If A calls B who then calls C without keep-
ing track of the call-stack, C only knows that B initiated
a request to it, not that the call from A prompted B to
make the call to C. This loss of context can have sig-
nificant security implications in a system like Android
where permissions are directly linked to the identity of
the principal requesting access to a sensitive resource.
Userspace
UID: 1
Call Chain: ()
Call TM(...)
EvilApp
UID: 2
Call Chain: (1)
Call LA(...)
TrustedMapper
UID: 3
Call Chain: (1,2)
VerifyCallChain(...)
LocationProvider
Operating System
Call chain: (1,2,3)
1         no GPS
2         GPS okay
3         GPS okay
PrivilegeManager
Figure 1: Defeating Confused Deputy attacks.
To address this, QUIRE’s design is for any given callee
to retain its caller’s call-chain and pass this to a down-
stream callee. The downstream callee will automatically
have its caller’s principal prepended to the ABLP state-
ment. In our above scenario, C will receive a statement
“B says A says Ok”, where Ok is an abstract token rep-
resenting that the given resource is authorized to be used.
It’s now the burden of C (or QUIRE’s privilege manager,
operating on C’s behalf) to prove Ok. As Wallach et
al. [29] demonstrated, this is equivalent to validating that
each principal in the calling chain is individually allowed
to perform the action in question.
Confused Deputy With this additional context, QUIRE
defeats Confused Deputy attacks; if any one of the prin-
cipals in the call chain is not privileged for the action
being taken, permission is denied. Figure 1 shows this in
the context of an evil application, lacking fine-grained
location privileges, which is trying to abuse the privi-
leges of a trusted mapping program, which happens to
have that privilege. The mapping application, never real-
izing that its helpful API might be a security vulnerabil-
ity, naı¨vely and automatically passes along the call chain
along to the location service. The location service then
uses the call chain to prove (or disprove) that the request
for fine-grained location show be allowed.
As with traditional stack inspection, there will be
times that an app genuinely wishes to exercise a priv-
ilege, regardless of its caller’s lack of the same privi-
lege. Stack inspection solves this with an enablePriv-
ilege primitive that, in the ABLP logic, simply doesn’t
pass along the caller’s call stack information. The callee
after privileges are enabled gets only the caller’s identity.
(In the example of Figure 1, the trusted mapper would
drop evil app from the call chain, and the location ser-
vice would only hear that the map application wishes to
3
use the service.)
Our design is, in effect, an example of the “security
passing style” transformation [29], where security be-
liefs are passed explicitly as an IPC argument rather than
passed implicitly as annotations on the call stack. One
beneficial consequence of this is that a callee might well
save the statement made by its caller and reuse them at
a later time, perhaps if they queue requests for later pro-
cessing, in order to properly modulate the privilege level
of outgoing requests.
Security analysis While apps, by default, will pass
along call chain information without modification,
QUIRE allows a caller to forge the identities of its up-
stream callers. No cryptography needs to be used to pre-
vent this. By enabling a caller to misrepresent its an-
tecedent call chain, this would seem to be a serious se-
curity vulnerability, but there is no incentive for a caller
to lie, since nothing it quotes from its antecedent callers
can increase its privileges in any way.
Conversely, our design requires the callee to learn the
caller’s identity in an unforgeable fashion. When the
callee prepends the “Caller says” tokens to the statement
it hears from the caller, using information that is avail-
able as part of every Android Binder IPC, any lack of
privileges on the caller’s part will be properly reflected
when the privileges for the trusted operation are later
evaluated.
Furthermore, our design is incredibly lightweight; we
can construct and propagate IPC call chains with very
little impact on the overall IPC performance (see Sec-
tion 5).
2.3 Verifiable Statements
Stack inspection semantics are helpful, but are not suf-
ficient for many security needs. We envision a variety
of scenarios where we will need semantics equivalent to
digital signatures, but with much better performance than
public-key cryptographic operations.
Definition A verifiable statement is a 3-tuple
[P,M,A(M)P] where P is the principal that said
message M, and A(M)P is an authentication token that
can be used by the Authority Manager OS service to
verify P said M. In ABLP, this tuple represents the
statement “P says M.”
In order to operate without requiring slow public-
key cryptographic operations, we must instead use mes-
sage authentication codes (MAC). MAC functions, like
HMAC-SHA1, run several orders of magnitude faster
than digital signature functions like DSA, but MAC func-
tions require a shared key between the generator and ver-
ifier of a MAC. To avoid an N2 key explosion, we instead
have every application share a key with a central, trusted
authority manager. As such, any app can produce a state-
ment “App says M”, purely by computing a MAC with
its secret key. However, for a second app to verify it, it
must send the statement to the authority manager. If the
authority manager says the MAC is valid, then the sec-
ond app will believe the veracity of the statement.
2.4 RPC attestations
When moving from on-device IPCs to Internet RPCs,
some of the properties that exist on the device disappear.
Most notably, the receiver of a call can no longer open
a channel to talk to the authority manager, even if they
did trust it1. To combat this, QUIRE’s design requires an
additional “network provider” system service, which can
speak over the network, on behalf of statements made on
the phone. This will require it to speak with a crypto-
graphic secret that is not available to any applications on
the system.
One method for getting such a secret key is to have the
phone manufacturer embed an X.509 certificate which
they sign along with the corresponding private key into
storage which is only accessible to the OS kernel. This
certificate can be used to establish a client-authenticated
TLS connection to a remote service, with the remote
server using the presence of the client certificate, as en-
dorsed by a trusted certification authority, to provide con-
fidence that it is really communicating with the QUIRE
phone’s operating system, rather than an application at-
tempting to impersonate the OS. With this attestation-
carrying encrypted channel in place, RPCs can then carry
a serialized form of the same statements passed along in
QUIRE IPCs, including both call chains and signed state-
ments, with the network provider trusted to speak on be-
half of the activity inside the phone.
All of this can be transmitted in a variety of ways,
such as a new HTTP header. Regular QUIRE applica-
tions would be able to speak through this channel, but the
new HTTP headers, with their security-relevant contex-
tual information, would not be accessible to or forgeable
by the applications making RPCs. (This is analogous to
the HTTP origin header [2], generated by modern web
browsers, but carries more detailed contextual informa-
tion from the caller.)
The strength of this security context information is
limited by the ability of the device and the OS to pro-
tect the key material. If a malicious application can
extract the private key, then it would be able to send
messages with arbitrary claims about the provenance of
the request. This leads us inevitably to techniques from
1Like it or not, with NATs, firewalls, and other such impediments
to bi-directional connectivity, we can only assume that the phone can
make outbound TCP connections, not receive inbound ones.
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the field of trusted platform measurement (TPM), where
stored cryptographic key material is rendered unavailable
unless the kernel was properly validated when it booted.
TPM chips are common in many of today’s laptops and
could well be installed in future smartphones.
Even without TPM hardware, Android phones gen-
erally prohibit applications from running with full root
privileges, allowing the kernel to protect its data from
malicious apps. This is a sound design until users
forcibly “root” their phones, which is commonly done
to work around carrier-instituted restrictions such as for-
bidding phones from freely relaying cellular data ser-
vices as WiFi hotspots. Regardless, most users will never
“root” their phones, preventing normal applications, even
if they want superuser privileges, from getting them, and
then compromising the network provider’s private keys.
Privacy. An interesting concern arises with our design:
Every RPC call made from QUIRE uses the unique pub-
lic key assigned to that phone. Presumably, the public
key certificate would contain a variety of identifying in-
formation, thus making every RPC personally identify
the owner of the phone. This may well be desirable
in some circumstances, notably allowing web services
with Android applications acting as frontends to com-
pletely eliminate any need for username/password di-
alogs. However, it’s clearly undesirable in other cases.
To address this very issue, the Trusted Computing Group
has designed what it calls “direct anonymous attesta-
tion”2, using cryptographic group signatures to allow the
caller to prove that it knows one of a large group of re-
lated private keys without saying anything about which
one. A production implementation of QUIRE could cer-
tainly switch from TLS client-auth to some form of
anonymous attestation without a significant performance
impact.
An interesting challenge, for future work, is being able
to switch from anonymous attestation, in the default case,
to classical client-authentication, in cases where it might
be desirable. One notable challenge of this would be
working around users who will click affirmatively on any
“okay / cancel” dialog that’s presented to them without
ever bothering to read it. Perhaps this could be finessed
with an Android privilege that is requested at the time
an application is installed. Unprivileged apps can only
make anonymous attestations, while more trusted apps
can make attestations that uniquely identify the specific
phone.
2http://www.zurich.ibm.com/security/daa/
3 Implementation
QUIRE is implemented as a set of extensions to the exist-
ing Android Java runtime libraries and Binder IPC sys-
tem. The authority manager and network provider are
trusted components and therefore implemented as OS
level services while our modified Android interface def-
inition language code generator provides IPC stub code
that allows applications to propagate and adopt an IPC
call-stack. The result, which is implemented in around
1300 lines of Java and C++ code, is an extension to
the existing Android OS that provides locally verifiable
statements, IPC provenance, and authenticated RPC for
QUIRE-aware applications and backward compatibility
for existing Android applications.
3.1 On- and off-phone principals
The Android architecture sandboxes applications such
that apps from different sources run as different Unix
users. Standard Android features also allow us to resolve
user-ids into human-readable names and permission sets,
based on the applications’ origins. Based on these fea-
tures, the prototype QUIRE implementation defines prin-
cipals as the tuple of a user-id and process-id. We include
the process-id component to allow the recipient of an IPC
method call to stipulate policies that force the process-id
of a communication partner to remain unchanged across
a series of calls. (This feature is largely ignored in the
applications we have implemented for testing and evalu-
ation purposes, but it might be useful later.)
While principals defined by user-id/process-id tuples
are sufficient for the identification of an application on
the phone, they are meaningless to a remote service.
QUIRE therefore resolves the user-id/process-id tuples
used in IPC call-chains into an externally meaningful
string consisting of the marshaled chain of application
names when RPC communication is invoked to move
data off the phone. This lazy resolution of IPC princi-
pals allows QUIRE to reduce the memory footprint of
statements when performing IPC calls at the cost of extra
effort when RPCs are performed.
3.2 Authority management
The Authority Manager discussed in Section 2 is imple-
mented as a system service that runs within the operating
system’s reserved user-id space. The interface exposed
by the service allows userspace applications to request
a shared secret, submit a statement for verification, or
request the resolution of the principal included in a state-
ment into an externally meaningful form.
When an application requests a key from the authority
manager, the Authority Manager maintains a table map-
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ping user-id / process-id tuples to the key. It is important
to note that a subsequent request from the same applica-
tion will prompt the Authority Manager to create a new
key for the calling application and replace the previous
stored key in the lookup table. This prevents attacks that
might try to exploit the reuse of user-ids and process-ids
as applications come and go over time.
3.3 Verifiable statements
Section 2 introduced the idea of attaching an OS veri-
fiable statement to an object in order to allow principals
later in a call-chain to verify the authenticity and integrity
of a received object.
Our implementation of this abstract concept involves
a parcelable statement object that consists of a principal
identifier as well as an authentication token. When this
statement object is attached to a parcelable object, the an-
notated object contains all the information necessary for
the Authority Manager service to validate the authentica-
tion token contained within the statement. Therefore the
annotated object can be sent over Android’s IPC chan-
nels and later delivered to the QUIRE Authority Manger
for verification by the OS as discussed in section 2.
QUIRE’s verifiable statement implementation estab-
lishes the authenticity of message with a hashed message
authentication code (HMAC) digest rather than a heavy-
weight public key digital signature. This implementation
decision drastically reduces the cost of creating and ver-
ifying a statement, as discussed in section 5 while still
providing the authentication and integrity semantics re-
quired by QUIRE.
Fast authenticator creation A fundamental assump-
tion of our decision to use Hashed Message Authentica-
tion Codes (HMACs) rather than public-key digital sig-
natures as our cryptographic mechanism for authentica-
tion was that the Android-provided HMAC library code
would yield results within a constant factor of OpenSSL’s
baseline numbers. In practice, doing HMAC-SHA1 in
pure Java was still slow enough to be an issue.
We resolved the issue by using the native C implemen-
tation from OpenSSL and exposing it to Java code as a
Dalvik VM intrinsic function, rather than a JNI native
method. This eliminated unnecessary copying and runs
at full native speed (see Section 5.2.1).
3.4 Code generator
The key to the stack inspection semantics that QUIRE
provides is an extension to the Android Interface Defi-
nition Language (AIDL) code generator. This piece of
software is responsible for taking in a generalized inter-
face definition and creating stub and proxy code to fa-
cilitate Binder IPC communication over the interface as
defined in the AIDL file.
The QUIRE code generator differs from the stock An-
droid code generator in that it adds directives to the mar-
shaling and unmarshaling phase of the stubs that pulls
the call-chain context from the calling app and attaches
it to the outgoing IPC message for the callee to retrieve.
These directives allow for the “quoting” semantics that
form the basis of a stack inspection based policy system.
Our prototype implementation of the QUIRE AIDL
code generator requires that an application developer
specify that an AIDL method become “QUIRE aware”
by defining the method with a reserved auth flag in the
AIDL input file. This flag informs the QUIRE code gen-
erator to produce additional proxy and stub code for the
given method that enables the propagation and delivery
of the call-chain context to the specified method. A pro-
duction implementation would pass this information im-
plicitly on all IPC calls.
4 Applications
We built two different applications to demonstrate the
benefits of QUIRE’s infrastructure.
4.1 Click fraud prevention
Current Android-based advertising systems, such as Ad-
Mob, are deployed as a library that an app includes as
part of its distribution. So far as the Android OS is con-
cerned, the app and its ads are operating within single do-
main, indistinguishable from one another. Furthermore,
because advertisement services need to report their ac-
tivity to a network service, any ad-supported app must
request network privileges, even if the app, by itself,
doesn’t need them.
From a security perspective, mashing these two dis-
tinct security domains together into a single app creates
a variety of problems. In addition to requiring network-
access privileges, the lack of isolation between the adver-
tisement code and its host creates all kinds of opportuni-
ties for fraud. The hosting app might modify the adver-
tisement library to generate fake clicks and real revenue.
This sort of click fraud is also a serious issue on the
web, and it’s typically addressed by placing the adver-
tisements within an iframe, creating a separate protec-
tion domain and providing some mutual protection. To
achieve something similar with QUIRE, we needed to ex-
tend Android’s UI layer and leverage QUIRE’s features to
authenticate indirect messages, such as UI events, dele-
gated from the parent app to the child advertisement app.
Design challenges Fundamentally, our design requires
two separate apps to be stacked (see Figure 2), with the
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Ad
Buy! Cool! Stuff!
Sample App
(transparent, so ad is visible)
Figure 2: The host and advertisment apps.
primary application on top, and opening a transparent
hole through which the subordinate advertising applica-
tion can be seen by the user. This immediately raises two
challenges. First, how can the advertising app know that
it’s actually visible to the user, versus being obscured by
the application? And second, how can the advertising
app know that the clicks and other UI events it receives
were legitimately generated by the user, versus being
synthesized or replayed by the primary application.
Stacking the apps This was straightforward to imple-
ment. The hosting application implements a translucent
theme (Theme.Translucent), making the background ac-
tivity visible. When an activity containing an adver-
tisement is started or resumed, we modified the activ-
ity launch logic system to ensure that the advertisement
activity is placed below the associated host activities.
When a user event is delivered to the AppFrame view,
it sends the event along with the current location of
AppFrame in the window to the an advertisement event
service. This allows our prototype to correctly display
the two apps together.
Visibility Android allows an app to continue running,
even when it’s not on the screen. Assuming our ad ser-
vice is built around payments per click, rather than per
view, we’re primarily interested in knowing, at the mo-
ment that a click occurred, that the advertisement was
actually visible. Android 2.3 added a new feature where
motion events contain an “obscured” flag that tells us
precisely the necessary information. The only challenge
is knowing that the MotionEvent we received was legiti-
mate and fresh.
Userspace
Delegate(e)
Sample App
VerifyMAC(e)
Ad View App
Operating System
kEM        “E.M.”
Auth Manager
ClickEvent e = {
  Time t
  Position x,y
  ... }
MACkEM(e)
Event Manager
Figure 3: Secure event delivery from host app to adver-
tisement app.
Verifying events With our stacked app design, motion
events are delivered to the host app, on top of the stack.
The host app then recognizes when an event occurs in the
advertisement’s region and passes the event along. To
complicate matters, Android 2.3 reengineered the event
system to lower the latency, a feature desired by game
designers. Events are now transmitted through shared
memory buffers, below the Java layer.
In our design, we leverage QUIRE’s signed statements.
We modified the event system to augment every Motion-
Event (as many as 60 per second) with one of our MAC-
based signatures. This means we don’t have to worry
about tampering or other corruption in the event sys-
tem. Instead, once an event arrives at the advertisment
app, it first validates the statement, then validates that
it’s not obscured, and finally validates the timestamp in
the event, to make sure the click is fresh. This process is
summarized in Figure 3.
At this point, the local advertising application can now
be satisfied that the click was legitimate and that the
ad was visible when the click occurred and it can com-
municate that fact over the Internet, unspoofably, with
QUIRE’s RPC service.
All said and done, we added around 500 lines of Java
code for modifying the activity launch process, plus a
modest amount of C code to generate the signatures.
While our implementation does not deal with every pos-
sible scenario (e.g., changes in orientation, killing of the
advertisement app due to low memory, and other such
things) it still demonstrates the feasibility of hosting of
advertisement in separate processes and defeating click
fraud attacks.
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Userspace
MAC Key: kA
PurchaseOrder po {
    Cost c
    Payee p ...}
MACkA(po)
ExampleApp
MAC Key: kPB
RPCPayBuddy.com(...)
PayBuddy
Operating System
kA          “ExampleApp”
kPB        “PayBuddy”
Auth Manager
“ExampleApp says ...”
“PayBuddy says ...”
Net Provider
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Figure 4: Message flow in the PayBuddy system.
4.2 PayBuddy
To demonstrate the usefulness of QUIRE for RPCs, we
implemented a micropayment application called Pay-
Buddy: a standalone Android application which exposes
an activity to other applications on the device to allow
those applications to request payments. By developing
this as a separate application we avoid many types of at-
tacks which circumvent user approval of payments.
To demonstrate how PayBuddy works, consider the
example shown in Figure 4. Application ExampleApp
wishes to allow the user to make an in-app purchase.
To do this, ExampleApp creates and serializes a pur-
chase order object and signs it with its MAC key kA.
It then sends the signed object to the PayBuddy appli-
cation, which can then prompt the user to confirm their
intent to make the payment. After this, PayBuddy passes
the purchase order along to the operating system’s Net-
work Provider. At this point, the Network Provider can
verify the signature on the purchase order, and also that
the request came from the PayBuddy application. It then
sends the request to the PayBuddy.com server over a
client-authenticated HTTPS connection. The contents of
ExampleApp’s purchase order are included in an HTTP
header, as is the call chain (“ExampleApp, PayBuddy”).
At the end of this, PayBuddy.com knows the follow-
ing:
• The request came from a particular device with a
given certificate.
• The purchase order originated from ExampleApp
and was not tampered with by the PayBuddy appli-
cation.
• The PayBuddy application approved the request
(which means that the user gave their explicit con-
sent to the purchase order).
At the end of this, if PayBuddy.com accepts the trans-
action, it can take whatever action accompanies the suc-
cessful payment (e.g., returning a transaction ID that
ExampleApp might send to its home server in order to
download a new level for a game).
Security analysis Our design has several curious prop-
erties. Most notably, the ExampleApp and the PayBuddy
app are mutually distrusting of each other.
The PayBuddy app doesn’t trust the payment request
to be legitimate, so it can present an “okay/cancel” dialog
to the user. In that dialog, it can include the cost as well
as the ExampleApp name, which it received through the
QUIRE call chain. The PayBuddy app will only commu-
nicate with the PayBuddy.com server if the user approves
the transaction.
Similarly, ExampleApp has only a limited amount of
trust in the PayBuddy app. By signing its purchase or-
der, and including a unique order number of some sort,
a compromised PayBuddy app cannot modify or replay
the message. Because the OS’s net provider is trusted to
speak on behalf of both the ExampleApp and the Pay-
Buddy app, the remote PayBuddy.com server gets am-
ple context to understand what happened on the phone
and deal with cases where a user later tries to repudiate a
payment.
Lastly, the user’s PayBuddy credentials are never vis-
ible to ExampleApp in any way. Once the PayBuddy
app is bound, at install time, to the user’s matching ac-
count on PayBuddy.com, there will be no subsequent
username/password dialogs. All the user will see is an
okay/cancel dialog. Once users are accustomed to this,
they will be more likely to react with skepticism when
presented with a phishing attack that demands their Pay-
Buddy credentials. (A phishing attack that’s completely
faithful to the proper PayBuddy user interface would
only present an okay/cancel dialog, which yields no use-
ful information for the attacker.)
5 Performance evaluation
5.1 Experimental methodology
All of our experiments were performed on the standard
Android developer phone, the Nexus One3, which has a
1GHz ARM core (a Qualcomm QSD 8250), 512MB of
RAM, and 512MB of internal Flash storage. We con-
ducted our experiments with the phone displaying the
3http://www.google.com/phone/static/en US-nexusone tech
specs.html
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Figure 5: Statement creation and verification time vs
payload size.
home screen and running the normal set of applications
that spawn at start up. We replaced the default “live wall-
paper” with a static image to eliminate its background
CPU load.
All of our benchmarks are measured using the An-
droid Open Source Project’s (AOSP) Android 2.3 (“Gin-
gerbread”) as pulled from the AOSP repository on De-
cember 21st, 2010. QUIRE is implemented as a series
of patches to this code base. We used an unmodified
Gingerbread build for “control” measurements and com-
pared that to a build with our QUIRE features enabled for
“experimental” measurements.
5.2 Microbenchmarks
5.2.1 Signed statements
Our first micro benchmark of QUIRE measures the cost
of creating and verifying statements of varying sizes. To
do this, we had an application generate random byte ar-
rays of varying sizes from 10 bytes to 8000 bytes and
measured the time to create 1000 signatures of the data,
followed by 1000 verifications of the signature. Each set
of measured signatures and verifications was preceded
by a priming run to remove any first-run effects. We then
took an average of the middle 8 out of 10 such runs for
each size. The large number of runs is due to variance
introduced by garbage collection within the Authority
Manager. Even with this large number of runs, we could
not fully account for this, leading to some jitter in the
measured performance of statement verification.
The results in Figure 5 show that statement creation
carries a minimal fixed overhead of 20 microseconds
with an additional cost of 15 microseconds per kilobyte.
Statement verification, on the other hand, has a much
higher cost: 556 microseconds fixed and an additional
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Figure 6: Roundtrip single step IPC time vs payload size.
96 microseconds per kilobyte. This larger cost is primar-
ily due to the context switch and attendant copying over-
head required to ask the Authority Manager to perform
the verification. However, with statement verification be-
ing a much less frequent occurrence than statement gen-
eration, these performance numbers are well within our
performance targets.
5.2.2 IPC call-chain tracking
Our next micro-benchmark measures the additional cost
of tracking the call chain for an IPC that otherwise per-
forms no computation. We implemented a service with
a pair of methods, of which one uses the QUIRE IPC ex-
tensions and one does not. These methods both allow us
to pass a byte array of arbitrary size to them. We then
measured the total round trip time needed to make each
of these calls. These results are intended to demonstrate
the slowdown introduced by the QUIRE IPC extensions
in the worst case of a round trip null operation that takes
no action on the receiving end of the IPC method call.
We discarded performance timings for the first IPC
call of each run to remove any noise that could have been
caused by previous activity on the system. The results in
Figure 6 were obtained by performing 10 runs of 100 tri-
als each at each size point, with sizes ranging from 0 to
6336 bytes in 64-byte increments.
These results show that the overhead of tracking the
call chain for one hop is around 70 microseconds, which
is a 21% slowdown in the worst case of doing no-op calls.
We also measured the effect of adding a second hop
into the call chain. This was done by having two services,
where the first service merely calls the second service,
which once again performs no action.
The results in Figure 7 show that the overhead of track-
ing the call chain for two hops avreages 145 microsec-
onds, which is a 20% slowdown in the worst case (or, in
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other words, the overhead introduced by the QUIRE IPC
appear to be a constant factor above stock Android IPC,
regardless of the call chain length).
5.2.3 RPC communication
Statement Depth Time (µs)
1 770
2 1045
4 1912
8 4576
Table 1: IPC principal to RPC principal resolution time.
The next microbenchmark we performed was deter-
mining the cost of converting from an IPC call-chain into
a serialized form that is meaningful to a remote service.
This includes the IPC overhead in asking the system ser-
vices to perform this conversion.
We found that, even for very long statement chains, the
extra cost of this computation is a small number of mil-
liseconds, which is irrelevant next to the other costs as-
sociated with setting up and maintaining a TLS network
connection. From this, we conclude that QUIRE RPCs
introduce no meaningful overhead beyond the costs al-
ready present in conducting RPCs over cryptographically
secure connections.
5.3 HTTPS RPC benchmark
To understand the impact of using QUIRE for calls to
remote servers, we performed some simple RPCs using
both QUIRE and a regular HTTPS connection. We called
a simple echo service that returned a parameter that was
provided to it. This allowed us to easily measure the ef-
fect of payload size on latency. We ran these tests on
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Figure 8: Network RPC latency in milliseconds.
a small LAN with a single wireless router and server
plugged into this router, and using the phone’s WiFi an-
tenna for connectivity. Each data point is the mean of 10
runs of 100 trials each, with the highest and lowest times
thrown out prior to taking the mean to remove anomalies.
The results in Figure 8 show that QUIRE adds an ad-
ditional overhead which averages around 6 ms, with a
maximum of 13.5 ms, and getting smaller as the payload
size increases. This extra latency is small enough that it’s
irrelevant in the face of the latencies experienced across
typical cellular Internet connections. From this we can
conclude that the overhead of QUIRE for network RPC
is practically insignificant.
5.4 Analysis
Our benchmarks demonstrate that adding call-chain
tracking can be done without a significant performance
penalty above and beyond that of performing standard
Android IPCs. Also, the cost of creating a signed state-
ment is low enough that it can easily be performed for
every touch event generated by the system. Finally, our
RPC benchmarks show that the addition of QUIRE does
not cause a significant slowdown relative to standard
TLS-encrypted communications.
6 Related work
6.1 Smart phone platform security
As mobile phone hardware and software increase in com-
plexity the security of the code running on a mobile de-
vices has become a major concern.
The Kirin system [10] and Security-by-Contract [8]
focus on enforcing install time application permissions
within the Android OS and .NET framework respec-
tively. These approaches to mobile phone security allow
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a user to protect themselves by enforcing blanket restric-
tions on what applications may be installed or what in-
stalled applications may do, but do little to protect the
user from applications that collaborate to leak data or
protect applications from one another.
Saint [23] extends the functionality of the Kirin sys-
tem to allow for runtime inspection of the full system
permission state before launching a given application.
Apex [22] presents another solution for the same prob-
lem where the user is responsible for defining run-time
constraints on top of the existing Android permission
system. Both of these approaches allow users to specify
static policies to shield themselves from malicious ap-
plications, but don’t allow apps to make dynamic policy
decisions.
CRePE [7] presents a solution that attempts to artifi-
cially restrict an application’s permissions based on en-
vironmental constraints such as location, noise, and time-
of-day. While CRePE considers contextual information
to apply dynamic policy decisions, it does not attempt to
address privilege escalation attacks.
6.1.1 Dynamic taint analysis on Android
The TaintDroid [9] and ParanoidAndroid [24] projects
present dynamic taint analysis techniques to preventing
runtime attacks and data leakage. These projects attempt
to tag objects with metadata in order to track information
flow and enable policies based on the path that data has
taken through the system. TaintDroid’s approach to in-
formation flow control is to restrict the transmission of
tainted data to a remote server by monitoring the out-
bound network connections made from the device and
disallowing tainted data to flow along the outbound chan-
nels. The goal of QUIRE differs from that of taint analy-
sis in that QUIRE allows applications to protect sensitive
data at the source as opposed to the network output.
The low level approaches used to tag data also differ
between the projects. TaintDroid enforces its taint propa-
gation semantics by instrumenting an application’s DEX
bytecode to tag every variable, pointer, and IPC message
that flows through the system with a taint value. In con-
trast, QUIRE’s approach requires only the IPC subsys-
tem be modified with no reliance on instrumented code,
therefore QUIRE can work with applications that use na-
tive libraries and avoid the overhead imparted by instru-
menting code to propagate taint values.
6.1.2 Decentralized information flow control
A branch of the information flow control space focuses
on how to provide taint tracking in the presence of mutu-
ally distrusting applications and no centralized authority.
Meyer’s and Liskov’s work on decentralized information
flow control (DIFC) systems [19, 21] was the first at-
tempt to solve this problem. Systems like DEFCon [17]
and Asbestos [27] use DIFC mechanisms to dynamically
apply security labels and track the taint of events moving
through a distributed system. These projects and QUIRE
are similar in that they both rely on process isolation
and communication via message passing channels that
label data. However, DEFCon cannot provide its secu-
rity guarantees in the presence of deep copying of data
while QUIRE can survive in an environment where deep
copying is allowed since QUIRE defines policy based on
the call chain and ignores the data contained within the
messages forming the call chain. Asbestos avoids the
deep copy problems of DEFCon by tagging data at the
IPC level. While Asbestos and QUIRE use a similar ap-
proach to data tagging, the tags are used for very dif-
ferent purposes. Asbestos aims to prevent data leaks by
enabling an application to tag its data and disallow a re-
cipient application from leaking information that it re-
ceived over an IPC channel while QUIRE attempts to pre-
emptively disallow data from being leaked by protecting
the resource itself, rather than allowing the resource to
be accessed then blocking leakage at the taint sink.
6.2 Operating system security
QUIRE is closely related to Taos [32]. Our design re-
places Taos’s expensive digital signatures with relatively
inexpensive HMAC authenticators. This approach was
also considered as an optimization in practical Byzantine
fault tolerance (PBFT) [6]. PBFT implementation using
HMAC authenticators cannot scale to large numbers of
nodes because each node requires a unique shared secret
with every other node. However, QUIRE can get away
with using HMACs as its authentication mechanism be-
cause each application need only register a shared secret
with a central point of authority, the operating system.
Network communication in QUIRE replaces the HMACs
with statements made through a cryptographically au-
thenticated channel.
6.3 Trusted platform management
Our use of a central authority for the authentication
of statements within QUIRE shares some similarities
with projects in the trusted platform management space.
Terra [11] and vTPM [4] both use virtual machines as
the mechanism for enabling trusted computing. The ar-
chitecture of multiple segregated guest operating systems
running on top of a virtual machine manager is similar to
the Android design of multiple segregated users running
on top of a common OS. However, these approaches both
focus on establishing the user’s trust in the environment
rather than trust between applications running within the
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system.
6.4 Web security
Many of the problems of provenance and application
separation addressed in QUIRE are directly related to
the challenge of enforcing the same origin policy from
within the web browser. Google’s Chrome browser [3,
25] presents one solution where origin content is segre-
gated into distinct processes. Microsoft’s Gazelle [30]
project takes this idea a step further and builds up
hardware-isolated protection domains in order to protect
principals from one another. MashupOS [14] goes even
further and builds OS level mechanisms for separating
principals while still allowing for mashups.
All of these approaches are more interested in protect-
ing principals from each other than in building up the
communication mechanism between principals. QUIRE
gets application separation for free by virtue of Android’s
process model, and focuses on the expanding the capa-
bilities of the communication mechanism used between
applications on the phone and the outside world.
6.5 Remote procedure calls
For an overview of some of the challenges and threats
surrounding authenticated RPC, see Weigold et al. [31].
There are many other systems which would allow for se-
cure remote procedure calls from mobile devices. Ker-
beros [16] is one solution, but it involves placing too
much trust in the ticket granting server (the phone man-
ufacturers or network providers, in our case). Another
potential is OAuth [12], where services delegate rights to
one another, perhaps even within the phone. This seems
unlikely to work in practice, although individual QUIRE
applications could have OAuth relationships with exter-
nal services and could provide services internally to other
applications on the phone.
7 Future work
We see QUIRE as a platform for conducting a variety of
interesting security research around smartphones.
Usable and secure UI design The IPC extensions
QUIRE introduces to the Android operating system can
be used as a building block in the design and imple-
mentation of a secure user interface. We have already
demonstrated how the system can efficiently sign every
UI event, allowing for these events to be shared and del-
egated safely.
Any opportunity to eliminate the need for user-
name/password dialogs from the experience of a smart-
phone user would appear to be a huge win, particularly
because it’s much harder for phones to display traditional
trusted path signals, such as modifications to the chrome
of a web browser. Instead, we can leverage the low-level
client-authenticated RPC channels to achieve high-level
single-sign-on goals. Our PayBuddy application demon-
strated the possibility of building single-sign-on systems
within QUIRE. Extending this to work with multiple CAs
or to integrate with OpenID / OAuth services would seem
to be a fruitful avenue to pursue.
License verification Google’s Android team recently
published an API for applications that wish to use the
Android Marketplace application to establish the licens-
ing validity of an installed instance of an application.
This license verification system consists of two parts.
First the Android Marketplace application, which facil-
itates the remote communication with Google’s servers
in order to look up the licensing information for a phone
and secondly the License Verification Library (LVL), a
bit of third party code that facilitates communication lo-
cally with the Marketplace app. Immediatly after the an-
nouncement of this system, an attack was presented [5] in
which an attacker can disassemble and modify the func-
tion of the LVL so that it interprets a response from the
Marketplace application that indicates the application us-
ing the LVL is not licensed for the phone as an approval
for use rather than disapproval. This attack could be eas-
ily prevented with the QUIRE extensions to Android’s
IPC mechanism.
LVL would run as a separate service, with its own
user-id, on the Android phone. Any application that
wishes to make use of the LVL would query it, which
would then either query the Android Marketplace or keep
a local policy cache, ultimately yielding a signed state-
ment in return to the caller.
Web browsers While QUIRE is targeted at the needs of
smartphone applications, there is a clear relationship be-
tween these and the needs of web applications in modern
browsers. Extensions to QUIRE could have ramifications
on how code plugins (native code or otherwise) interact
with one another and with the rest of the Web. Exten-
sions to QUIRE could also form a substrate for building
a new generation of browsers with smaller trusted com-
puting bases, where the elements that compose a web
page are separated from one another. This contrasts with
Chrome [25], where each web page runs as a monolithic
entity. Our QUIRE work could lead to infrastructure sim-
ilar, in some respects, to Gazelle [30], which separates
the principals running in a given web page, but lacks our
proposed provenance system or sharing mechanisms.
An interesting challenge is to harmonize the differ-
ences between web pages, which increasingly operate as
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applications with long-term state and the need for ad-
ditional security privileges, and applications (on smart-
phones or on desktop computers), where the principle
of least privilege [26] is seemingly violated by running
every application with the full privileges of the user,
whether or not this is necessary or desirable.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we presented QUIRE, a set of extensions to
the Android operating system that enable applications to
propagate call chain context to downstream callees and
to authenticate the origin of data that they receive indi-
rectly. When remote communication is needed, our RPC
subsystem allows the operating system to embed attesta-
tions about message origins and the IPC call chain into
the request. This allows remote servers to make policy
decisions based on these attestation.
We implemented the QUIRE design as a backwards-
compatible extension to the Android operating system
that allows existing Android applications to co-exist with
applications that make use of QUIRE’s services.
We evaluated our implementation of the QUIRE design
by measuring our modifications to Android’s Binder IPC
system with a series of microbenchmarks. We also im-
plemented two applications which use these extensions
to provide click fraud prevention and in-app micropay-
ments.
Our work shows that a Taos-style system, with ap-
plications tracking call chains and making signed state-
ments to one another, can be implemented efficiently on
a mobile platform, enabling a variety of novel security
applications.
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